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I. INTRODUCTION 
The P.A.S.™ Passive Alcohol Sensor III (nicknamed the "Sniffer") 
(Sniffer) stepped into the technology arena to do battle with drunk 
driving. Like any good battle, the fans are divided, with the Sniffer's 
maker, PAS Systems International, Inc., and law enforcement officials 
on one side and civil liberties groups and drivers on the other. The Sniffer 
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is a hand-held, battery-powered flashlight with a built-in alcohol sensor.' 
As a police officer shines the flashlight in a driver's face, the Sniffer 
samples exhaled breath as the driver speaks, analyzing it for the presence 
of alcohol.2 In a matter of seconds, a color-coded display on the 
flashlight alerts the officer to the presence of alcohol and provides an 
approximate blood alcohol concentration (BAC).3 Because the driver's 
active participation is not needed to produce a BAC reading, the Sniffer 
is heralded as a "passive" device.4 The Sniffer can detect alcohol in a 
person's breath as well as alcohol that may be in the ambient air inside a 
vehicle due to exhaled breath in the enclosed space or open containers of 
alcohol.5 The point of this "nonintrusive" device is to help police 
officers formulate the probable cause needed to warrant an arrest without 
the driver's active involvement.6 
This usage, however, is the very reason battle lines are being drawn. 
Let the Sniffer be the swords of the law enforcement officials, and the 
Fourth Amendment becomes the shield to those who would oppose its 
use. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution7 protects 
1. PAS Systems International Inc., P.A.S. III Sniffer, at http://www.sniff 
alcohol.com/prod0l.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2002). The Web site, however, calls the 
Sniffer a "Non-Invasive Alcohol Screening Instrument with a Built-In High Intensity 
Flashlight." Id. 
2. Id. The Web site provides, "The P.A.S.™ III, unlike active hand-held breath 
analyzers, samples air in front of and around an individual just as a person may smell 
another's breath. The P.A.S.™ III does not touch a person in any way." Id. 
3. Id. The Web site shows a picture of the Sniffer and supplies directions for its use: 
Taking a Breath Sample: 1) Hold the P.A.S. about 5-7 inches from subject's 
mouth[;] 2) Have subject speak for 5 to 10 seconds (example: have subject 
give name, address, and date of birth)[;] 3) Tap power switch once and release 
while the subject is speaking[;] 4) Watch bars light up; wait about 20 seconds 
until peak reading is established; Note this reading[;] 5) Tap power switch 
again to tum off the sensor[;] 6) See reverse side for approximate B.A.C. 
Id. On the flashlight's color-coded display, an approximate B.A.C. of .01 or .02 shows a 
green light; approximate B.A.C.'s of .03, .04, .05, and .06 show a yellow light; and 
approximate B.A.C.'s of .08, .10, and .12 show a red light. Id. 
4. Id. Arguably, by requiring a breath sample from the driver which presumably 
is going to come from the driver's act of speaking, the driver is "actively" participating 
in the Sniffer's operation. The contrast between having the driver speak to generate 
breath samples for the Sniffer and having the driver actively blow into a traditional 
breathalyzer is likely the distinguishing characteristic that makes the Sniffer a "passive" 
device. 
5. Id. Furthermore, the Sniffer's alcohol sensor is "unaffected by acetone, paint 
and glue fumes, foods, confectionery, methane and practically any other substance likely 
to be found in the breath (other than alcohol)." Id. 
6. Id. The Web site provides: "there should be no question of a 'trespass' or 
'intrusion' into the privacy of an individual. It is not an evidential test and its results 
should not be presented as such." Id. 
7. The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth 
Amendment is also applicable to the states). 
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against unreasonable searches and seizures. 8 A seizure takes place when 
a police officer, "by means of physical force or show of authority, has in 
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen."9 Additionally, "a person 
has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, 
in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable 
person would have believed that he was not free to leave."10 Following 
the Supreme Court's paramount decision in Katz v. United States, 11 for a 
search to have occurred, a person must be able to claim a reasonable 
expectation of privacy into which the government has intruded. 12 A 
reasonable expectation of privacy is recognized where a person has an 
actual, subjective expectation of privacy, which is objectively reasonable.13 
Where no reasonable expectation of privacy exists, governmental action 
does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. 14 Moreover, 
once classified as a search, governmental action is only proscribed by 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In full, it states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. Id. 
9. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 19 n.16 (1968). 
10. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
11. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
12. This test has evolved from Justice Harlan's statement in his concurring opinion 
in Katz that "a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of 
privacy." Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
740 (1979) ("Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the application 
of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can 
claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has been 
invaded by government action."). 
13. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740. In construing the meaning of a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, the Court said: 
[A]s Mr. Justice Harlan aptly noted in his Katz concurrence, [this inquiry] 
normally embraces two discrete questions. The first is whether the individual, 
by his conduct, has "exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation ofprivacy,"-
whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual has shown that "he 
seeks to preserve [something] as private." The second question is whether the 
individual's subjective expectation of privacy is "one that society is prepared 
to recognize as 'reasonable,"'-whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the 
individual's expectation, viewed objectively, is '1ustifiable" under the 
circumstances. 
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
14. E.g., id. at 745-46 (holding that the installation and use of a pen register was 
not a search under the Fourth Amendment because the defendant had "no actual 
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and that, even if he did, his 
expectation was not" objectively reasonable). 
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the Fourth Amendment if it constitutes an unreasonable search. 15 The 
reasonableness of a governmental search, in tum, depends upon 
"balancing its intrusion on [an] individual's Fourth Amendment interests 
against [ the search' s] promotion of legitimate governmental interests." 16 
In construing this balancing test, the Supreme Court delineated three 
factors to be examined in each particular case to assess reasonableness-
the nature of the individual's privacy interest, the character of the 
intrusion, and the nature and immediacy of the governmental interest at 
issue. 17 
Lurking somewhere in the gamut of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
lies the framework under which the constitutionality of the Sniff er will 
be tested. Because opponents and proponents of the Sniffer both find 
and proclaim different aspects of Fourth Amendment law to justify their 
conflicting positions over the Sniffer, the battle, which has yet to make it 
inside any court, is a complicated tangle of constitutional interpretation. 
In simplest terms, the issue to be addressed is whether the use of the 
Sniffer is constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment. 
A brief overview of the various arguments for and against the Sniffer 
may be useful at this point to highlight some of the areas that will be 
addressed. Opponents of the Sniffer take issue with the fact that police 
officers who utilize these flashlights can ascertain a driver's BAC 
without the driver having consented to testing and without the driver 
even knowing that such testing has commenced. 18 With the more 
traditional Breathalyzer™, which requires the driver to blow into a 
device, and with field sobriety tests, which require the driver to perform 
physical tests, the driver has implicitly consented and presumably knows 
the officer's purpose is to ascertain intoxication. 19 With the Sniffer, as 
the argument goes, officers are able to conduct searches without the 
15. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) ("[W]hat the Constitution forbids is not all 
searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.") (quoting Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)). "[T]he central inquiry under the Fourth 
Amendment [is] the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular 
governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." Id. at 19. 
16. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); see also Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977). In Mimms, the Court said: 
The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always "'the 
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion 
of a citizen's personal security."' Reasonableness, of course, depends "'on a 
balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal 
security free from arbitrary interference by law officers."' 
Id. at 108-09 (citations omitted) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19; United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)). 
17. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-64 (1995). 
18. Eric Peters, Vaporizing Personal Rights?, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2000, at 
A18, 2000 WL 4164640. 
19. See id. 
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driver's lrnowledge or consent, perhaps even before the driver has done 
anything which would suggest to an officer that the driver has been 
drinking.20 After the Sniffer has provided the officer with a BAC 
reading, the officer is possibly only then armed with probable cause to 
believe the driver has been drinking and may then require the driver to 
undergo further alcohol testing to assess whether the driver should be 
arrested. 21 
Civil liberties groups and defense lawyers argue that the hidden breath 
alcohol screening instrument inside the flashlight violates the driver's 
right to privacy when it tests a breath sample.22 As long as the driver's 
breath is still in the car, that breath is "in a zone of privacy."23 Other 
arguments suggesting that use of the Sniffer constitutes an unreasonable 
search and seizure have included the following: in using the Sniffer, 
officers are impermissibly enhancing their sense of smell to reveal the 
presence of alcohol;24 for drivers who are pulled over because of minor 
traffic violations, the use of the Sniffer becomes a fishing expedition to 
catch alcohol-impaired drivers;25 because a trained officer can use his or 
her own natural senses in observing and speaking to a driver to assess 
whether field sobriety tests or Breathalyzer tests are needed, sticking the 
flashlight in a driver's face is intrusive;26 and, the Sniffer gives officers 
discretion to decide whether any particular driver will be tested and 
hence discretion to invade a person's privacy.27 
Proponents of the Sniffer find no fault with a device that "is nothing 
more than an extension of an officer's nose."28 The Sniffer is meant to 
help an officer establish probable cause to make an arrest and is not 
intended to replace traditional Breathalyzer and field sobriety tests.29 
20. Id. 
21. Warren Richey, Will Privacy Rights Pass the Smell Test?: Police in Half the 
States are Using Hidden Breathalyzers to Help Catch Drunk Drivers, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Aug. 23, 2000, at 2, available at 2000 WL 4430443. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Mary P. Gallagher, Civil Libertarians Wince at New Device that 'Shines Light' 
on Drunken Drivers, N.J. L.J., Aug. 21, 2000, WL 161 NJLJ 782. 
25. Id. 
26. See id. 
21. Id. 
28. Joey Ledford, The Lane Ranger: If It Drives Like a Drunk, and Smells Like a 
Drunk ... , A1LANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 21, 1999, at 2B, 1999 WL 3769599 (quoting 
Jarel. R. Kelsey, President of PAS Systems). 
29. Id. 
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The device is used only to determine whether further testing is needed. 30 
Other arguments backing the Sniffer include: the probable cause 
determination can be made faster by utilizing a Sniffer than by leaving 
the officers to their own natural senses;31 more drunk drivers will be 
caught when officers are using the device because it is more objective 
than other police procedures;32 detecting more drunk drivers justifies the 
"minor inconvenience to drivers;"33 all the device is doing is sampling 
air that has already left the driver's body;34 drivers do not enjoy a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their exhaled breath;35 exhaled 
breath is "abandoned property" and thus not protected under the Fourth 
Amendment;36 the "plain sight doctrine" allows the officer to observe, 
with his senses, breath which is in plain sight without violating the 
Fourth Amendment;37 and finally, the results of the Sniffer are not 
admissible as evidence of guilt in court.38 
The purpose of this Comment is to assess how the United States 
Supreme Court would ultimately decide where the Sniffer stands vis-a-
vis Fourth Amendment privacy rights. The benefit of a device that can 
assist police officers in detecting more drunk drivers must not also 
function as an affront to Fourth Amendment protections. The analysis 
will flush out the various arguments supporting and denouncing the 
constitutionality of the Sniffer and attempt to decipher how these 
arguments square with the current state of the law. 
This Comment will start with a short overview of the drunk driving 
problem in the United States by referring to the statistical data of the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). The 
standards of probable cause and reasonable suspicion will be briefly 
discussed to demonstrate what is required of an officer to lawfully stop a 
motorist and to classify the types of drivers who may be stopped by the 
police. A more in-depth discussion of the law with regard to seizures 
and searches will follow, focusing on what laws govern the use of 
flashlights and devices used to determine the alcohol content of a breath 
sample. An assessment of where the Sniffer falls in the search law arena 
will be included. As part of a reasonableness inquiry, which necessitates 
30. Brooke A. Masters & Tom Jackman, Sniffer Routs Out Drunk Drivers; Rights 
Advocates Decry Use of Device, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2000, at Bl. 
31. See Gene Crider, Officers' New Tool to Shine light on Drunken Drivers, 
HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), June 27, 2000, at 2B, 2000 WL 6573895. 
32. See Masters & Jackman, supra note 30, at B 1. 
33. Richey, supra note 21, at 2. 
34. Masters & Jackman, supra note 30, at B 1. 
35. Richey, supra note 21, at 2. 
36. Id. 
37. See id. 
38. Masters & Jackman, supra note 30, at B 1. 
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the use of a balancing test, the various arguments will be analyzed to 
distinguish those which are legitimate from others which may be less 
sound. Ultimately, this Comment will use a classification of the various 
types of drivers who may be subjected to the Sniffer search depending 
on the reasons for their initial detention to conclude that as to some 
drivers the instrument may be constitutional, while as to others, it 
transgresses Fourth Amendment protections. 
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF AMERICA'S DRUNK DRIVING PROBLEM 
The statistical data on the prevalence of alcohol-related fatalities39 
attests to the tragedy of drunk driving. For the year 1999, over 41,000 
persons were killed in traffic fatalities; of these, 15,976 were alcohol-
related, representing 38% of total traffic fatalities.40 In 1998, 15,935 
persons were killed in alcohol-related fatalities, again representing 38% 
of total traffic fatalities for the year.41 This figure, however, represents a 
33% reduction in alcohol-related fatalities from the 23,626 persons 
killed in 1988.42 Looking further back, in 1997, 16,189 persons were 
killed in alcohol-related fatalities;43 in 1996, 17,126 persons were killed 
in alcohol-related crashes;44 and in 1995, 17,274 persons were killed in 
39. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) identifies a fatal 
traffic crash as alcohol related "if either a driver or a nonoccupant (e.g., pedestrian) 
had a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.01 grams per deciliter (g/dl) or 
greater in a police-reported traffic crash. Persons with a BAC of 0.10 g/dl or greater 
involved in fatal crashes are considered to be intoxicated." Nat'! Highway Traffic 
Safety Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., Traffic Safety Facts 1998: Alcohol, at 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/ncsa/FactPrev/pdf/ Alcohol98.pdf (last visited Apr. 
19, 2002) [hereinafter Traffic Safety Facts 1998]. 
40. Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Total Traffic Fatality vs. Alcohol Related 
Traffic Fatality, at http://www.madd.org/stats/0,1056,1298,00.html (last visited Apr. 19, 
2002) (figures provided by NHTSA). 
41. Traffic Safety Facts 1998, supra note 39. The 15,935 fatalities "represent an 
average of one alcohol-related fatality every 33 minutes." Id. In 1998, total traffic 
fatalities equaled 41,471 persons. Id. Of these, 12,456 persons (30% of all traffic 
fatalities) were killed in crashes where at least one driver or nonoccupant had a BAC of 
0.10 g/dl or greater, 3479 persons (8% of all traffic fatalities) were killed in crashes 
where at least one driver or nonoccupant had a BAC between 0.01 and 0.09 g/dl, and the 
remaining 25,536 traffic fatalities were not alcohol related. Id. 
42. Id. This represents 50% of the total traffic fatalities for 1988. Id. 
43. Nat'! Highway Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., Alcohol: Traffic 
Safety Facts 1997, at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/ncsa/FactPrev/Alcohol9.html 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2002). 
44. Nat'! Highway Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., Alcohol: Traffic 
Safety Facts 1996, at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/ncsa/FactPrev/alc96.html (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2002). 
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alcohol-related crashes.45 Thus, according to these figures, from 1995 
through 1999, alcohol-related traffic fatalities were decreasing. In 2000, 
however, 16,653 persons were killed in alcohol-related traffic fatalities, 
an increase of 4% from 1999.46 
In 2000, "an estimated 310,000 persons were injured in crashes where 
police reported that alcohol was present."47 According to the NHTSA, 
"the rate of alcohol involvement in fatal crashes is more than 3 times as 
high at night as during the day.',48 ''For all crashes the alcohol involvement 
rate is more than 4 times as high at night [as during the day].',49 
Recognizing the alarming prevalence of drunk driving accidents, the 
Supreme Court noted: "The increasing slaughter on our highways, most 
of which should be avoidable, now reaches the astounding figures only 
heard of on the battlefield.''50 
Indicative of America's continuing interest in diminishing the often 
tragic incidents of drunk driving, in 2000, President Clinton signed into 
law a measure that sets a national standard of a .08 BAC as the legal 
level for drunk driving.51 The measure requires states to adopt a .08 
BAC standard by 2004. 52 States failing to act in accordance with the 
45. Nat'! Highway Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., Alcohol: Traffic 
Safety Facts 1995, at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/peopJe/ncsa/FactPrev/alcfacts.html 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2002). 
46. Nat'I Highway Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., Traffic 
Safety Facts 2000: Alcohol, at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/ncsa/tsf2000/ 
2000alcfacts.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2002). 
47. Id. 
48. Id. (61 % at night versus 18% during the day). 
49. Id. (17% at night versus 4% during the day). 
50. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957); see also Michigan Dep't of 
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) ("No one can seriously dispute the 
magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it. Media 
reports of alcohol-related death and mutilation on the Nation's roads are legion. The 
anecdotal is confirmed by the statistical."). 
51. Drunk-Driving limit Is Signed into Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2000, at A5, 
2000 WL 25424190. Citing the NHTSA, Mothers Against Drunk Driving claims, "[a] 
170-pound male typically would have to consume more than four drinks in one hour on 
an empty stomach to reach a BAC of .08. A 137-pound female typically would have to 
consume three drinks in the same time frame" to reach a .08 BAC. Mothers Against 
Drunk Driving, Stats & Resources, at http://www.madd.org/stats/0,1056,1767,00.html 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2002). 
52. Scott Bowles, National Drunken-Driving Standard Passes, USA TODAY, Oct. 
4, 2000, at 3A, 2000 WL 5791494. As of October 2000, eighteen states and the 
District of Columbia had a .08 BAC level for drunk driving and thirty-one states had a 
.10 level; Massachusetts deems a .08 BAC "evidence but not proof of drunkenness." 
Id. As of July 2001, the NHTSA reports that since the passage of the .08 BAC law in 
October 2000, "ten [additional] states have passed Jaws or have a law pending the 
Governor's signature" adopting the .08 BAC standard, bringing the total to twenty-
eight states complying with the new Jaw (two states have Jaws awaiting the 
'Governor's signature), as well as Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia. Nat'I 
Highway Traffic Safety Admin. U.S. Dep't of Transp., National Highway Traffic 
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new national standard could lose millions of dollars in federal highway 
funds.53 Clinton said, "this .08 standard is the biggest step to toughen 
drunk driving laws and reduce alcohol related crashes since a national 
minimum drinking age was established a generation ago."54 The new 
law, according to Clinton, is reasonable and will be effective in making 
drivers more careful of drinking and driving.55 The President noted that, 
"[a]lcohol is still the single greatest factor in motor vehicle deaths and 
injuries. This law, .08, is simply a common sense way to help stop 
that."56 Stopping "that" is, of course, a most laudable goal, one which 
proponents of the Sniffer hope can be achieved by detecting more drunk 
drivers in the beam of a flashlight. Where the Sniffer is concerned, 
however, reducing the number of alcohol-related fatalities is not the 
problem. No one can deny the societal benefits of eradicating drunk 
driving. The problem, if there is one, is in the manner by which the 
Sniffer detects the drunk drivers in the first place. 
ill. SEIZING THE DRIVER 
A. The Initial Stop of the Driver 
Quite obviously, before a driver gazes into the "high intensity" 
flashlight beam of the Sniffer and unwittingly provides a breath sample 
for the alcohol sensor, a police officer must have stopped the driver. 
Stopping a motorist implicates the Fourth Amendment because, as the 
Court pointed out in Delaware v. Prouse,51 "stopping an automobile and 
detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of [the 
Fourth Amendment] even though the purpose of the stop is limited and 
the resulting detention quite brief."58 In Prouse, a police officer stopped 
Safety Administration Impaired Driving Program, July 2001, Legislation, at 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcohol/impairedjuly/legislation.html (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2002). 
53. Bowles, supra note 52, at 3A. States failing to adopt the .08 BAC as the legal 
level for drunk driving by 2004 will lose 2% of their federal highway funds. Id. By 
2007, the penalty for noncompliance will increase to an 8% loss of federal highway 
funds. Id. 
54. Clinton's Remarks on Drunk Driving Standard, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 23, 
2000, at 10:05 am EDT, 2000 WL 26850117. The President said experts who have 
studied the .08 standard estimate that it will save at least 500 lives a year. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
58. Id. at 653; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). In Whren, 
571 
a vehicle merely to check the driver's license and registration and as a 
result of the stop, seized some marijuana in plain view in the car.59 The 
trial court granted the driver's motion to suppress the seized narcotics 
after finding the stop to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 60 The 
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, holding "that 'a random stop of a 
motorist in the absence of specific articulable facts which justify the stop 
by indicating a reasonable suspicion that a violation of the law has 
occurred is constitutionally impermissible and violative of the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. "'61 The 
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that stopping a vehicle only to check a 
license and registration, where there is neither probable cause to believe 
the driver is violating the law nor reasonable suspicion to believe the 
driver is unlicensed or the car unregistered, amounts to an unreasonable 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.62 
The Supreme Court upholds suspicionless seizures of motorists only 
in limited situations. In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,63 
the Court found no Fourth Amendment violation with regard to a 
the Court stated: 
Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the 
police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a 
"seizure" of "persons" within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment]. An 
automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be 
"unreasonable" under the circumstances. 
Id. at 809-10 (citations omitted). 
59. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 650. 
60. Id. at 65 l. 
61. Id. As enunciated in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993) 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)), the typical formulation of reasonable 
suspicion is '"where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him 
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot ... ,' 
the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make 'reasonable inquiries' aimed 
at confirming or dispelling his suspicions." In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 
(1990), the Court said: 
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not 
only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information 
that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable 
cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from 
information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. 
62. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661, 663. The Court noted that such stops would give 
officers too much discretion to stop motorists and intrude upon privacy interests 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 661-63. The Court did state, however, in 
dictum, that its holding did not prevent the State of Delaware or other states "from 
developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the 
unconstrained exercise of discretion." Id. at 663. The Court suggested that stopping and 
questioning all traffic at roadblocks may be a constitutional alternative to the random 
seizures it struck down in the case. Id.; see Richard A. Ifft, Curbing the Drunk Driver 
Under the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEO. L.J. 
1457, 1459 (1983) (suggesting that lower federal and state courts have relied on the 
Prouse dictum to uphold roadblock stops). 
63. 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
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sobriety checkpoint program that allowed police to stop all vehicles and 
check all drivers for signs of intoxication even in the absence of 
individualized suspicion that any particular driver was intoxicated.64 
The Court determined that "the balance of the State's interest in 
preventing drunken driving, the extent to which [the checkpoints could] 
reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion 
upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped" justified the State's 
sobriety checkpoint program. 65 
Suspicionless seizures of motorists were also upheld in United States 
v. Martinez-Fuerte where the Court rejected a Fourth Amendment 
challenge to the operation of fixed checkpoints near the Mexican border 
that allowed police to stop and briefly question motorists about their 
citizenship without any individualized suspicion that any particular car 
contained illegal aliens.66 Here too, the Court engaged in a balancing 
analysis, weighing the public interest against the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interest in being free from arbitrary governmental 
intrusions. 67 
Motorists may be stopped on the basis of a reasonable articulable 
suspicion.68 In United States v. Hunnicutt,69 a police officer followed a 
vehicle for about five miles as it weaved across the shoulder and center 
64. See id. at 447,455. The program provided that "[a]ll vehicles passing through 
a checkpoint would be stopped and their drivers briefly examined for signs of 
intoxication." Id. at 447. Drivers not showing any signs of intoxication would be 
permitted to go on their way. If, however, an "officer detected signs of intoxication, the 
motorist would be directed to [pull aside] where an officer would check the motorist's 
driver's license and car registration and, if warranted, conduct [field] sobriety tests." Id. 
An arrest would be made where the combination of the officer's observations and the 
field sobriety tests suggested intoxication. Id. 
65. Id. at 455. This balancing test was derived from Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 
50-51 (1979), where the court set out that "[t]he reasonableness of seizures that are less 
intrusive than a traditional arrest" depends on a balance between "the gravity of the 
public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the 
public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty." 
66. 428 U.S. 543,545 (1976). 
67. Id. at 555. 
68. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
Under the Fourth Amendment, we have held, a policeman who lacks probable 
cause but whose "observations lead him reasonably to suspect" that a 
particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, 
may detain that person briefly in order to "investigate the circumstances that 
provoke suspicion." 
Id. at439 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,881 (1975) (footnote 
omitted)). 
69. 135 F.3d 1345 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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line. The officer stopped the vehicle, suspecting that the driver was 
under the influence of alcohol.70 The driver argued that the stop was in 
contravention of the Fourth Amendment because no traffic violations 
had transpired and the lane weaving was merely a pretext to search the 
vehicle.71 The tenth circuit disagreed; to justify the stop, the government 
was not required to show an actual traffic violation.72 The court said: 
An initial traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment not only if based on 
an observed traffic violation, but also if the officer has a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring .... 
Our sole inquiry is whether the particular officer had reasonable suspicion that 
the particular motorist violated "any ... of the multitude of applicable traffic 
and equipment regulations" of the jurisdiction.73 
The court found the stop consistent with the Fourth Amendment 
because the officer had both a reasonable articulable suspicion that the 
driver had violated a traffic law pertaining to the proper use of lanes and 
a reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver was under the influence 
of alcohol.74 
Thus, for the initial stop to be lawful, the driver must have been pulled 
over because the officer: (1) had probable cause to believe the driver had 
committed a traffic violation; or (2) had a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that the driver had committed a traffic violation or was under 
the influence of alcohol. Also, the officer might pull over a motorist for 
a traffic violation and, in the course of investigating that violation, 
circumstances may give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the 
driver is intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol. Following 
Prouse, a driver may not be pulled over for no reason (excluding 
sobriety checkpoints and fixed interior border checkpoints).75 
70. Id. at 1347. 
71. Id. at 1348. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)). 
74. Id. In Carlsen v. Duron, No. 99-4065, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 21428, at *2, 
*6-7 (10th Cir. Aug. 24, 2000), officers stopped the driver for making a wide right hand 
tum in violation of a Utah statute, driving too slow, and braking for no reason. The court 
concluded the stop was not only supported by probable cause due to the observed traffic 
Jaw violation but also by a reasonable suspicion that the driver was under the influence 
of alcohol. 
75. Another case reproving random, suspicionless stops of motorists for 
investigatory purposes is United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975), 
which requires roving border patrol agents to have a reasonable suspicion that an 
illegal alien is in the car to stop and question motorists. 
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B. Arresting the Driver 
To subsequently arrest a driver who has been lawfully stopped for a 
traffic violation, a police officer must have probable cause. The Warrant 
Clause of the Fourth Amendment provides, "no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized."76 Hence, an arrest warrant must be based upon probable 
cause.77 A warrantless arrest must also be supported by probable 
cause.78 "Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances 
within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had 
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to 
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has 
been or is being committed."79 Once a lawful arrest is made, police 
officers are authorized to perform a full body search of the arrestee, 
pursuant to the "search incident to arrest" exception to the warrant 
requirement. 80 Therefore, to effectuate a valid drunk driving arrest, an 
officer must lawfully stop the driver and the vehicle and then ascertain 
"facts and circumstances" giving rise to probable cause to warrant such 
an arrest. 
76. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
77. Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states: 
If it appears from the complaint, or from an affidavit or affidavits filed with the 
complaint, that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been 
committed and that the defendant has committed it, a warrant for the arrest of 
the defendant shall issue to any officer authorized by law to execute it. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a). 
78. E.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,415 (1976) (stating that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3061 "represents a judgment by Congress that it is not unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment for postal inspectors to arrest without a warrant provided they have probable 
cause to do so"); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (noting that the validity of Beck's 
arrest, where the officers had no arrest warrant, depended on whether the officers had 
probable cause to make such an arrest); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 309-10, 
314 (1959) (explaining that because a federal narcotic agent had probable cause under 
the Fourth Amendment and reasonable grounds under section 104(a) of the Narcotic 
Control Act of 1956 to believe that Draper had committed a violation of narcotics laws, 
Draper's arrest "was therefore lawful"). 
19. Draper, 358 U.S. at 313 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 
(1925)). 
80. Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). Following an arrest, a 
police officer may search the arrestee and the area "'within his immediate control"' to 
remove any weapons and seize any evidence in the arrestee's possession to prevent its 
destruction. Id. at 763. 
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IV. THE LAW AS IT PERTAINS TO SEARCHES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated."81 Writing for the majority in Katz v. United States,82 Justice 
Stewart, in determining when a search occurs, wrote: "What a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve 
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected."83 
Justice Harlan, writing a concurring opinion, hung the question of 
what constitutes a search on a privacy rung.84 He stated: "[A] person has 
a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy."85 A 
reasonable expectation of privacy is based on a "twofold requirement, 
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared 
to recognize as 'reasonable. "'86 Thus, to implicate the Fourth 
Amendment, the Sniffer must be found to infringe upon a driver's 
reasonable expectation of privacy which, in tum, is based upon the 
existence of a subjective expectation of privacy that society deems 
legitimate. If the Sniffer's operation constitutes a search, then a further 
inquiry of whether such a search may be unreasonable is required. 
At the outset of the Fourth Amendment analysis, the question stands 
whether the Sniffer's operation can be said to constitute a search. With 
its dual capabilities, that of a flashlight and an alcohol sensor, 87 the 
answer is perhaps not immediately apparent. This Part will first explore 
the law surrounding the use of flashlights and then look at how breath 
alcohol screening instruments square with search law before attempting 
81. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
82. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
83. Id. at 348, 351-52 (citations omitted). In Katz, the Court found the electronic 
monitoring of the defendant's conversations constituted a search. Although the defendant 
could be seen inside the phone booth, what he sought to preserve as private was his 
conversation, which he did by shutting the door to the booth. See id. at 352-53. 
84. Id. at 360. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965), the Court 
found a right of privacy to exist within the penumbras of the specific guarantees of the 
Bill of Rights. The Court noted that "the Fourth Amendment ... creat[es] a 'right to 
privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the 
people."' Id. at 485 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)). Writing for the 
dissent in Schmerber v. Califomia, 384 U.S. 757, 778-79 (1966), Justice Douglas wrote, 
"the Fourth Amendment recognizes that right [ of privacy] when it guarantees the right of 
the people to be secure 'in their persons."' 
85. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360. 
86. Id. at 361. 
87. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3. 
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to predict where the Sniffer, which is, in effect, a combination of the 
two, will come out. 
A. Flashlights 
Assuming a car is first lawfully stopped,88 a police officer's 
subsequent use of a flashlight to illuminate the interior of the vehicle has 
been consistently upheld as a nonsearch under the Fourth Amendment.89 In 
Texas v. Brown,90 an officer stopped respondent Brown's vehicle during 
a routine driver's license checkpoint. The officer asked Brown for his 
license and shined his flashlight into the car whereupon he observed 
Brown remove his hand from his pocket with a green balloon wrapped 
between his two fingers.91 Brown dropped the balloon onto his seat and 
reached across to open the glove compartment, at which point the officer 
"shifted his position in order to obtain a better view of the interior of the 
glove compartment."92 Reversing the judgment of the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals, the Supreme Court stated: 
88. A driver who has been pulled over by a police officer has been "seized" within 
the meaning of Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (stating that a seizure takes 
place when the officer "by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some 
way restrained the liberty of a citizen"); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 
(1979) (explaining that "stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a 
'seizure' within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment], even though the purpose of the 
stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief'). Because a vehicle stop 
constitutes a seizure, it must not be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Whren 
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996). Such a seizure can be reasonable and 
therefore lawful when based on probable cause or the lesser standard of reasonable 
suspicion. See supra Part III.A. 
89. E.g., United States v. Booker, 461 F.2d 990, 992 (6th Cir. 1972) (stating that 
"[f]lashing the flashlight in the rear of the car did not constitute a search of the car"); 
United States v. Kim, 430 F.2d 58, 61 (9th Cir. 1970) ("[The officer] flashed his 
flashlight into the car, which he had a right to do for his own protection if for no other 
reason. Such conduct does not constitute a search.") (citation omitted); State v. Lamp, 
322 N.W.2d 48, 52 (Iowa 1982) (explaining that the use of artificial light to "illuminate 
articles that would be readily visible in daylight" does not render invalid the observation 
of items in plain view inside a vehicle, and thus does not constitute a search); State v. 
Shevchuk, 191 N.W.2d 557, 558-59 (Minn. 1971) (holding an officer's observation ofa 
firearm in plain sight in defendant's automobile, where the officer shined his flashlight 
into the vehicle, was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). 
90. 460 U.S. 730 (1983). 
91. Id. at 733. 
92. Id. at 733-34. 
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It is . . . beyond dispute that [ the officer's] action in shining his flashlight to 
illuminate the interior of Brown's car trenched upon no right secured to the 
latter by the Fourth Amendment. The Court said in United States v. Lee: "[The] 
use of a searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass. It 
is not prohibited by the Constitution." Numerous other courts have agreed that 
the use of artificial means to illuminate a darkened area simply does not 
constitute a search, and thus triggers no Fourth Amendment protection.93 
Moreover, whatever officers may discover by utilizing a flashlight to 
illuminate the inside of the vehicle is said to fall within the plain view 
doctrine.94 In United States v. Johnson,95 officers stopped a vehicle for 
running a stop sign.96 One officer shined a flashlight into the vehicle to 
perform an inventory search after arresting the driver on an outstanding 
warrant. A sawed-off shotgun appeared to be lodged between the 
cushions of the back seat and the officer seized it.97 Applying the plain 
view doctrine, the eighth circuit upheld the district court's denial of the 
driver's motion to suppress the shotgun as having been retrieved 
pursuant to a warrantless search of the vehicle.98 The court said: "Under 
the 'plain view' doctrine, a plain view observation made by a police 
officer from a position where the officer is entitled to be is not a 'search' 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the 
restrictions of the Fourth Amendment are not applicable."99 The court 
reasoned that the officer had a right to be in a position to view the inside 
of the vehicle because of the traffic stop and upheld his use of the 
flashlight. 100 The court stated: "The fact that the contents of the vehicle 
may not have been visible without the use of artificial illumination does 
93. Id. at 739--40 (citation omitted). Wayne R. LaFave offers the following 
explanation for why courts treat the use of a flashlight as a nonsearch: "[T]he owner or 
operator of an automobile parked or being operated upon a public thoroughfare does not 
have a justified expectation that such a common device as a flashlight would not be used 
during the nighttime to see what would be visible without such illumination during 
daylight hours." WAYNER. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ 2.2(b) (3d ed. 1996). 
94. E.g., United States v. Landry, 903 F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1990) ("After Polk 
got out of the truck, Officer Roy shined his flashlight into the cab of the truck and 
discovered the money which was in plain view. His use of the flashlight to aid his vision 
did not transform an otherwise valid plain view observation into an illegal search."); 
United States v. Hood, 493 F.2d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 1974) ("An officer shined his 
flashlight in the car and saw vials of pills in plain view in Mrs. Hood's open purse. His 
use of the flashlight did not constitute a search and what he saw was encompassed within 
the plain view doctrine."): Booker, 461 F.2d at 992 ("Since it would not constitute a 
search for the officer to observe objects in plain view in the automobile in daylight, it 
ought not to constitute a search for him to flash a light in the car as he was walking past 
it in the night season."). 
95. 506 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974). 




100. Id. at 676. 
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not preclude such observation from application of the 'plain view' 
doctrine."101 
By illuminating the inside of a vehicle, the case law makes clear that 
the Sniffer, as a flashlight, is not performing any search proscribed by 
the Fourth Amendment. Any objects of an apparently criminal nature 
would presumably be subject to seizure under the plain view doctrine as 
if the officer were using a plain flashlight with no alcohol-sensing 
capabilities. When the beam of the Sniffer's flashlight is turned on, the 
driver, at this point, has no Fourth Amendment shield to raise; the 
necessity for its protections has yet to come into play. 
B. Breath Alcohol Screening Instruments 
Once the driver is asked to speak so that the Sniffer's alcohol sensor 
may sample his breath and provide the officer with an approximate 
BAC, the landscape begins to change. Laying the foundation for the law 
as it pertains to governmental intrusions into the human body, in 
Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court held that a compulsory 
blood test constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.102 
Following an automobile accident, the petitioner was arrested at a 
hospital for driving under the influence of alcohol because based on the 
petitioner's "symptoms of drunkenness" both at the scene and at the 
hospital, "there was plainly probable cause for the officer to arrest 
petitioner."103 The officer ordered a physician to take a blood sample 
despite the petitioner's refusal, and subsequent chemical testing of the 
sample revealed intoxication. The results of this testing were later used 
at trial.104 
In addressing the petitioner's argument that the blood test transgressed 
his right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures under the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court noted that blood tests "plainly constitute 
IOI. Id.; see also Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1970). 
When the circumstances of a particular case are such that the police officer's 
observation would not have constituted a search had it occurred in daylight, 
then the fact that the officer used a flashlight to pierce the nighttime darkness 
does not transform his observation into a search. Regardless of the time of day 
or night, the plain view rule must be upheld where the viewer is rightfully 
positioned . . . . The plain view rule does not go into hibernation at sunset. 
Id. at 189. 
102. 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). 
103. Id. at 768--69. 
104. Id. at 758-59. 
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searches of 'persons,' and depend antecedently upon seizures of 
'persons,' within the meaning of that Amendment." 105 The Court, in its 
analysis, undertook a dual inquiry of "whether the police were justified 
in requiring petitioner to submit to the blood test, and whether the means 
and procedures employed in taking his blood respected relevant Fourth 
Amendment standards of reasonableness." 106 As to the first question, 
the Court, commenting on "searches involving intrusions beyond the 
body's surface,"107 stated: 
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment 
protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence 
might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such 
evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers 
to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate 
search. 108 
Here, the Court said that the facts supporting the probable cause 
determination "suggested the required relevance and likely success of a 
test of petitioner's blood for alcohol." 109 The officer was not required to 
obtain a search warrant prior to requesting the administration of the 
blood test due to the exigencies of the situation; the delay in doing so 
might have "threatened 'the destruction of evidence."'110 The Court 
upheld the blood test as a valid search incident to petitioner's lawful 
arrest; 111 no Fourth Amendment violation was found to exist. 112 
Subsequent to the Schmerber decision, the Supreme Court similarly 
determined Breathalyzer tests to constitute searches within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' 
Ass'n. 113 The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) adopted 
regulations that authorized breath and urine tests of employees who 
105. Id. at 767. 
106. Id. at 768. 
107. Id. at 769. 
108. Id. at 769-70. 
I 09. Id. at 770. 
I 10. Id. (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)). The Court 
stated: "We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly 
after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system." Id. Because 
of the time required in this particular case to bring the petitioner to the hospital, "there 
was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant." Id. at 771. 
111. Id. As to the second inquiry, the Court said the blood test was a reasonable 
way of ascertaining the petitioner's BAC and the actual test was administered 
reasonably. Id. 
112. Id. at 772. The Court made a point of noting the narrowness of its holding to 
the facts of this case. The Court stated: "That we today hold that the Constitution does 
not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited 
conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions 
under other conditions." Id. 
113. 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989). 
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violated safety rules and mandated blood and urine tests of employees 
involved in certain train accidents. 114 The issue before the Court was 
whether these regulations were in contravention of the Fourth 
Amendment. As an initial matter, the Court assessed whether the 
various tests constituted searches or seizures before conducting a 
reasonableness inquiry. 115 The Court stated: 
We have long recognized that a "compelled intrusio[n] into the body for blood 
to be analyzed for alcohol content" must be deemed a Fourth Amendment 
search. In light of our society's concern for the security of one's person, it is 
obvious that this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an 
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The 
ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data is a further 
invasion of the tested employee's privacy interests. Much the same is true of 
the breath-testing procedures . . . . Subjecting a person to a [B] reathalyzer test, 
which generally requires the production of alveolar or "deep lung" breath for 
chemical analysis, implicates similar concerns about bodily integrity and, like 
the blood-alcohol test we considered in Schmerber, should also be deemed a 
search. 116 
C. The Sniffer 
For Fourth Amendment purposes, the Sniffer's alcohol-sensing device 
is functionally equivalent to a Breathalyzer test. A Breathalyzer requires 
a person to blow into the device and provides an officer with a BAC.117 
The Sniffer's alcohol sensor analyzes a breath sample and provides the 
officer with an approximate BAC. 118 Some posit that what the Sniffer 
does is justified by the plain view doctrine, and therefore argue that it is 
not necessary to reach a conclusion as to whether the Sniffer is 
performing a search. The driver's breath is in plain view of the officer 
who has a right to be in a position to view that breath, assuming the stop 
of the vehicle is lawful. The breath is, therefore, subject to seizure under 
the plain view doctrine and no search of the person transpires. 
The plain view doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement 
114. Id. at 606. 
115. Id. at 614. 
116. Id. at 616-17 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see 
also Commonwealth v. Quarles, 324 A.2d 452,460 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974) (explaining 
that the "Commonwealth treats the administration of a breathalyzer test as a search and 
seizure" because there is a seizure of air and "the material seized comes from within the 
suspect's body''). 
117. See Gil Sapir & Mark Giangrande, Right to Inspect and Test Breath Alcohol 
Machines: Suspicion Ain't Proof, 33 J. MARSHALLL. REv. 1, 3-4 (1999). 
118. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3. 
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that justifies seizures of "evidence incriminating the accused," where the 
police officer has "a prior justification for [the] intrusion" that brings the 
officer within fc1ain view of the item(s) to be seized. 119 In Harris v. 
United States, 1 0 the Court stated: "It has long been settled that objects 
falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the 
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced 
in evidence."121 Application of the plain view doctrine depends upon the 
following three factors: first, the officer must lawfully be in a position to 
view the object subject to seizure; second, the officer must have a lawful 
right of access to the object itself; and third, the incriminating character 
of the object in plain view must be '"immediately apparent"' to the 
officer. 122 Where these three factors are satisfied, the police officer may 
validly seize the incriminating evidence without a warrant. 123 
An officer who lawfully stops a vehicle based on probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion will lawfully be in a position to view an object in 
plain view inside a vehicle. 124 Likewise, the officer will have a lawful 
right of access to the object itself. As to the third prong, that the 
incriminating character of the object be immediately apparent to the 
officer, the Court in Texas v. Brown125 explained that immediately 
apparent means only that the officer has probable cause to believe the 
object in plain view is evidence of a crime. 126 While an officer cannot 
see breath and determine that it is likely incriminatory due to alcohol 
consumption, the officer certainly may smell alcohol in a driver's breath, 
thus giving rise to probable cause to believe the driver is intoxicated. 
119. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1971). "The doctrine 
serves to supplement the prior justification-whether it be a warrant for another object, 
hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being 
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused-and permits the 
warrantless seizure." Id. at 466. 
120. 390 U.S. 234 (1968). 
121. Id. at 236 (emphasis added). 
122. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990). In Horton, the Court 
stated: 
It is, of course, an essential predicate to any valid warrantless seizure of 
incriminating evidence that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed. 
There are, moreover, two additional conditions that must be satisfied to justify 
the warrantless seizure. First, not only must the item be in plain view, its 
incriminating character must also be "immediately apparent." ... Second, not 
only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can 
be plainly seen, but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the 
object itself. 
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,466 (1983)). 
123. Id. 
124. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 506 F.2d 674,676 (8th Cir. 1974). 
125. 460 U.S. 730 (1983). 
126. Id. at 741-42. 
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In United States v. Martinez-Miramontes, 127 a customs agent 
approached a vehicle on the roadside abandoned by two individuals and 
sniffed around the trunk which was "hanging pretty low."128 He 
detected the odor of marijuana. 129 The ninth circuit disagreed with the 
appellant that the agent's act of sniffing around the trunk constituted a 
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.130 The court said: "We 
find no distinction of substance between leaning down and turning the 
head to look inside a motor vehicle to see articles which then come 
within the 'plain view' doctrine, and leaning down and sniffing to detect 
the odor of marijuana."131 The court concluded that no Fourth 
Amendment intrusion took place because the agent, "[b]y the use of [his] 
ordinary senses while standing in a place where [he] had a right to be 
standing," was allowed to "detect the nature" of whatever was contained 
inside the trunk.132 Martinez-Miramontes was subsequently cited with 
approval by the court in United States v. Pagdn133 as "very persuasive on 
the point of the extension of the 'plain view' doctrine to the use of other 
senses to establish probable cause."134 The court continued: "No longer 
is an officer restricted to seizing evidence that is in 'plain view.' Now 
the doctrine has been expanded to cover that evidence that can be 
perceived by the sense of smell."135 · 
Accepting this extension of the plain view doctrine, an officer who 
smells alcohol on a driver's breath will satisfy the third prong of the 
plain view doctrine because the officer could establish probable cause to 
believe the driver is under the influence of alcohol. Having satisfied the 
three requirements of the plain view doctrine by the use of olfactory 
senses, the officer can seize that breath without a warrant, meaning the 
officer can use the information he picks up by smelling alcohol as part of 
his overall probable cause determination to possibly make an arrest for 
drunk driving. Smelling the alcoholic breath in plain view of the officer 
127. 494 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1974). 
128. Id. at 809. 
129. Id. at 809-10. 
130. Id. at 810. 
131. Id. (citation omitted). 
132. Id. 
133. 395 F. Supp. 1052 (D.P.R. 1975). 
134. Id. at 1060. 
135. Id. at 1060-61; see also United States v. Pierre, 958 F.2d 1304, 1310 (5th Cir. 
1992) ("[Border Patrol Agent] Hillin was lawfully within the car when he smelled the 
burned marijuana. Thus, the evidence falls within the plain view ( or plain smell) 
exception to the warrant or probable cause requirement"). 
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gives the officer probable cause at this point in the detention, depending 
on what other factors have already transpired, to arrest the driver, or at 
least it gives the officer a reasonable suspicion to conduct further 
inquiries, such as requiring the driver to perform field sobriety tests. 136 
The seizure of the breath, however, does not justify a subsequent search of 
the breath by the Sniffer's alcohol sensor, absent consent on the part of the 
driver. 137 The driver's breath is sucked into the alcohol sensor, put 
through a chemical analysis, and then the sensor provides the officer with 
information about the driver's BAC. The driver is therefore subjected to a 
search; the Sniffer is performing a search of the driver, apart from the 
officer's own ability to smell for the presence of alcohol. 138 
V. THE REASONABLENESS INQUIRY 
If the argument is accepted that, based on Skinner, 139 the Sniffer is 
performing a search of the person within the meaning of the Fourth 
136. The officer need only have a reasonable suspicion of intoxication to require a 
lawfully detained driver to submit to field sobriety tests. E.g., Kinberg v. District of 
Columbia, No. 94-2516 (PLF), 1998 WL 10364, at *28 (D.D.C. Jan. 5, 1998), a.ff'd sub 
nom. Rogala v. District of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
137. One might argue that exhaled breath is abandoned property and therefore is not 
protected under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment does not protect 
abandoned property. Edward G. Mascolo, The Role of Abandonment in the Law of 
Search and Seizure: An Application of Misdirected Emphasis, 20 BUFF. L. REV. 399, 
400-01 (1970) ("In short, the theory of abandonment is that no issue of search is 
presented in such a situation, and the property so abandoned may be seized without 
probable cause."). This argument, however, is unpersuasive. In City of St. Paul v. 
Vaughn, 237 N.W.2d 365, 371 (Minn. 1975), the court explained that in the context of 
search and seizure, the question of abandonment is whether the defendant has 
"relinquished his reasonable expectation of privacy" in the discarded property "so that its 
seizure and search is reasonable within the limits of the Fourth Amendment. . . . [Wlhat 
is abandoned is not necessarily the defendant's property, but his reasonable expectation 
of privacy therein." A driver's breath, exhaled from the body as the driver speaks to the 
officer does not constitute abandoned property because the driver certainly maintains a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in it, insofar as it has the capacity to reveal the driver's 
BAC. Furthermore, considering the driver has no choice but to exhale as part of the 
normal function of his respiratory system, application of the abandoned property doctrine 
in this context is inherently unfair. 
138. In June of 2001, the Supreme Court held that the use of thermal imaging 
devices to measure heat emissions from private homes constitutes a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and is thus presumptively unreasonable without a 
warrant. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29, 40 (2001). Justice Scalia, writing for 
the majority, stated: "We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any 
information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been 
obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,' constitutes a 
search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use." 
Id. at 34 (citation omitted) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 
(1961)). By analogy, the Sniffer is obtaining information regarding the interior of a 
person-the BAC of a person's breath-and hence can be said to constitute a search. 
139. 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
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Amendment, then that Amendment's protections are implicated and 
further analysis is required. Because "what the Constitution forbids is 
not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures,"140 
the fate of the Sniffer falls upon a reasonableness inquiry. The Court in 
Delaware v. Prouse141 stated: ''The essential purpose of the proscriptions 
in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of 'reasonableness' 
upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law 
enforcement agents, in order 'to safeguard the privacy and security of 
individuals against arbitrary invasions."'142 The Court continued: "Thus, 
the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by 
balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests 
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests."143 Citing the 
Prouse balancing test as the standard for assessing the reasonableness of 
a governmental search, the Court in Vernonia School District 47J v. 
Acton144 broke the reasonableness test up into the following three 
factors: first, "the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search 
here at issue intrudes";145 second, "the character of the intrusion that is 
complained of';146 and third, "the nature and immediacy of the 
governmental concern at issue here, and the efficacy of this means for 
meeting it."147 
A. The Privacy Interest 
As to the first factor, the Vernonia Court explained that the Fourth 
Amendment only protects subjective expectations of privacy that "society 
recognizes as 'legitimate."'148 Furthermore, "[w]hat expectations are 
140. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 
206, 222 (1960)). "[T]he central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment [is] the 
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a 
citizen's personal security." Id. at 19. 
141. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
142. Id. at 653-54 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307,312 (1978)). 
143. Id. at 654; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ("[T]here is 'no ready test for 
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against 
the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails."' (alterations in original) (quoting 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967))). 
144. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
145. Id. at 653-54. 
146. Id. at 658. 
147. Id. at 660. 
148. Id. at 654 (citations omitted) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,338 
(1985)). 
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legitimate varies, of course, with context, depending, for example, upon 
whether the individual asserting the privacy interest is at home, at work, 
in a car, or in a public park."149 Quite obviously, the individuals asserting 
the privacy interest at issue here-the drivers being subjected to a 
Sniffer search-are in cars. Drivers and passengers alike, the Supreme 
Court has pointed out, have "a reduced expectation of privacy" inside a 
vehicle. 150 Yet the justification for this reduced expectation of privacy 
has no logical bearing on a driver's privacy expectation in his or her 
breath. As the Court noted in Robbins v. California, 151 the reduced 
expectation of privacy that inheres in a vehicle "arises from the facts that 
a car is used for transportation and not as a residence or a repository of 
personal effects, that a car's occupants and contents travel in plain view, 
and that automobiles are necessarily highly regulated by government."152 
A driver's breath cannot seriously be taken to constitute "content" in 
plain view or a "personal effect" inside a vehicle within the meaning 
likely intended by the Court.153 Moreover, the Court already decided in 
Skinner that a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard 
to intrusions into the body for breath. 154 Indeed, classifying 
Breathalyzers as searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
in Skinner necessarily required the Court, in light of Katz, 155 to recognize 
that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her breath. 
This reasonable expectation of privacy would be based on a person's 
actual subjective expectation of privacy which is objectively reasonable.156 
Thus, the first prong of the reasonableness inquiry can be satisfied-a 
driver has a subjective, legitimate, expectation of privacy in his or her 
breath as far as it reveals information about the state of the driver's 
body, regardless of whether the individual is sitting in a vehicle or 
walking down the street. 
149. Id. (citations omitted). 
150. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) (noting that drivers and 
passengers have a "reduced expectation of privacy with regard to the property that they 
transport in cars" given that cars use public roadways, are subject to be stopped and 
examined by law enforcement officials, aren't intended to be warehouses for personal 
belongings, and are "exposed to traffic accidents that may render all their contents open 
to public scrutiny"). 
151. 453 U.S. 420 (1981). 
152. Id. at 424. 
153. Breath is not like an umbrella, a sawed-off shotgun, or drug paraphernalia 
thrown on the floor of a car. 
154. See supra text accompanying notes 113-16. 
155. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
156. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Character of the Intrusion 
Turning to the second prong, the "character of the intrusion that is 
complained of," merely requiring the driver to talk for a few seconds to 
generate the breath sample presents no apparent hardship or risk of 
embarrassment. Furthermore, use of the Sniffer may very well prevent 
an officer from making an arrest he would otherwise have made in the 
absence of the information provided by the instrument by dispelling a 
suspicion of intoxication. Perhaps most noteworthy is the fact that the 
Sniffer's approximate BAC reading is not admissible evidence in 
court.157 As such, the Sniffer is not providing information of an 
evidential nature to be used against the driver in a criminal proceeding; 
rather, the Sniffer's reading is meant only to provide the officer with 
another factor to consider in the officer's overall assessment of whether 
probable cause exists to arrest the driver for drunk driving. 158 The 
intrusion, in the sense that the officer has knowledge of the driver's 
BAC, does not appear so jarring when due recognition is given to the 
fact that the Sniff er' s results cannot be used in court. 159 
157. That is, at least according to its maker, PAS Systems International. The Web 
site provides, "[The Sniffer] is not an evidential test and its results should not be 
presented as such." PAS Systems International, P.A.S. III Sniffer, at http://www. 
sniffalcohol.com/prod0I.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2002). 
158. Somewhat pertaining to the touted inadmissibility of the Sniffer's results is 
Volk v. United States, 51 F. Supp. 2d 888 (N.D. Cal. 1999), where an officer, upon 
stopping a driver for a traffic violation and subsequently detecting the odor of alcohol on 
the driver's breath, administered a series of field sobriety tests, the last of which was a 
"preliminary alcohol screen test." Id. at 890-91. This test required the driver to blow 
into a small device that provided the officer with a reading of the driver's estimated 
blood alcohol. The specific results of the preliminary alcohol screen test were not 
introduced at the driver's consequent trial on charges of driving under the influence of 
alcohol; however, the officer who performed the field sobriety testing did testify that the 
reading confirmed that the driver had consumed alcohol. Id. at 891. The preliminary 
alcohol screen test differs from the Sniffer in that the driver has knowledge that his or 
her breath is being tested to ascertain a blood alcohol level; the hallmark of the Sniffer is 
that it provides the officer with an approximate BAC without the driver's knowledge. 
Nevertheless, it is foreseeable that although officers may not testify at trial to the specific 
numerical reading provided by the Sniffer, they may testify, as in Volk, that the Sniffer 
confirmed their suspicions of intoxication. Such a statement likely has the same 
incriminating effect as does testimony of the specific number produced by the Sniffer. 
The intrusion, therefore, may not be so minimal where the Sniffer's operation can affect 
the results of a trial and not just serve to aid solely the officer in assessing probable cause 
to arrest. 
159. Presumably, the makers had in mind that once the officer had probable cause 
to arrest the driver and did in fact arrest the driver, the officer could then administer a 
Breathalyzer or some other test for BAC pursuant to the state's implied consent law, the 
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Yet, the Sniffer is still revealing private information to the police 
officer about the state of the driver's body, namely, the driver's approximate 
BAC. This information is being revealed without the driver's knowledge or 
consent to be tested and inform the officer of the driver's BAC. 
Moreover, officers have discretion to tap the power switch on the 
flashlight that triggers the breath analysis of every driver they pull over, 
regardless of whether suspicion of alcohol consumption was a factor 
justifying the stop. 
Furthermore, the surreptitious manner in which the Sniffer operates 
obviates any opportunity on the driver's part to refuse to be subject to 
such testing. The Sniffer has the effect of bypassing state implied 
consent laws which authorize police to administer Breathalyzers only 
after making an arrest. 160 Even implied consent laws provide the driver 
with the option of refusing to take the Breathalyzer test, although the 
driver will be faced with possible license suspension and like 
sanctions. 161 The intrusion into a driver's privacy is greater in a situation 
where the Sniffer is used as compared to a situation where it is not and 
the implied consent law is followed. 
As to the latter scenario, the officer has to acquire probable cause to 
make an arrest for drunk driving, presumably using his own observations 
and field sobriety tests. Once the officer has made the arrest, only then 
may the officer request the arrested driver to submit to a Breathalyzer 
test. The driver may refuse to take the test. 
In the Sniffer situation, on the other hand, the officer is able to 
conduct a search and collect an approximate BAC as part of the officer's 
probable cause determination, before any arrest is made. The officer 
perhaps is able to make an arrest where he might not have without the 
aid of the Sniffer because the approximate BAC provided can bolster the 
probable cause determination. Of course, the officer still needs to take a 
results of which are admissible in court. 
160. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.1932 (West 2001). Section 316.1932(l)(a) 
provides that a driver in the state is deemed to have given consent to submit to a 
chemical or physical test to determine blood alcohol content "if the person is lawfully 
arrested for any offense allegedly committed while the person was driving or was in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic 
beverages." Id. Section 316.1932(1)(a) further states: "The chemical or physical breath 
test must be incidental to a lawful arrest and administered at the request of a law 
enforcement officer who has reasonable cause to believe such person was driving ... 
while under the influence of alcoholic beverages." Id.; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN.§ 257.625c (West 2001). 
161. For Example, section 316.1932(1)(a) states that the arrestee must be informed 
that the "failure to submit to any lawful test of his or her breath ... will result in the 
suspension of the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle for a period of l year." 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.1932(l)(a). Furthermore, "[t]he refusal to submit to a chemical 
or physical breath test ... is admissible into evidence in any criminal proceeding." Id. 
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postarrest Breathalyzer reading to have admissible evidence in court, 
because the Sniffer's results are not admissible. So the driver in the 
Sniffer situation is searched twice. Even if the drivers in both situations 
refuse to submit to the postarrest breath tests, the driver's BAC in the 
Sniffer situation is at least already made known to the officer. 162 
In those states where the implied consent laws do not require an arrest 
before a Breathalyzer test may be administered, 163 the need to use the 
Sniffer may be obviated if the police officer can administer a Breathalyzer 
test anyway. Pennsylvania, for example, requires the officer to have 
reasonable grounds before administering a breath test.164 Under such 
circumstances, the argument can be made that using the Sniffer may aid 
the officer in forming the requisite reasonable grounds to administer the 
breath test. This argument, however, overlooks the fact that the Sniffer 
is still performing a search of the driver. 
PAS Systems International, Inc., the Sniffer's maker, posits on its 
Web site that the Sniffer's purpose is to help the officer "formulate 
probable cause without the subject's active involvement."165 Presumptively, 
the hope is that the officer, having utilized the Sniffer to garner probable 
cause, now may lawfully arrest the driver if the BAC reading indicates 
the appropriateness of so doing. If the argument is accepted, however, 
that the Sniffer performs a search of the driver, then the situation 
becomes one where the officer is performing a search to gather evidence 
to justify a subsequent arrest of the driver. That is, the officer is 
conducting a search to gather probable cause to make an arrest. This 
series of events is somewhat backwards from the typical "search incident 
to arrest" scenario where the officer, already armed with Erobable cause, 
makes an arrest and then searches incident to that arrest.1 6 
162. Moreover, even if both drivers refuse to submit to postarrest breath tests, for 
the driver in the Sniffer situation, the officer could still testify at trial that the reading 
provided by the Sniffer confirmed the consumption of alcohol, even though the officer 
does not testify to the specific number provided. See discussion supra note 158. 
163. E.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547 (West 1996 & Supp. 2001). Section 
1547(a) provides that any person driving in the state is deemed to have given consent to 
a chemical test of breath to determine blood alcohol content "if a police officer has 
reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving, operating or in actual 
physical control of the movement of a motor vehicle: ... while under the influence of 
alcohol." Id. In Commonwealth v. Quarles, 324 A2d 452, 466 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974), 
the court construed "reasonable grounds" to mean "probable cause." 
164. See discussion supra note 163. 
165. PAS Systems International, Inc., P.A.S. III Sniffer, at http://www.sniffalcohol. 
com/prod0l.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2002). 
166. Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Following an arrest, a police 
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The Court, in Sibron v. New York, 167 stated: "It is axiomatic that an 
incident search may not precede an arrest and serve as part of its 
justification."168 Further expanding on this principle, Justice Harlan, 
concurring in the case, wrote: 
Of course, the fruits of a search may not be used to justify an arrest to which it 
is incident, but this means only that probable cause to arrest must precede the 
search. If the prosecution shows probable cause to arrest prior to a search of a 
man's person, it has met its total burden. There is no case in which a defendant 
may validly say, "Although the officer had a right to arrest me at the moment 
when he seized me and searched my person, the search is invalid because he did 
not in fact arrest me until afterwards."169 
Sibron, therefore, helps to shape the following conclusions: if the 
officer has no probable cause to make an arrest prior to using the Sniffer, 
then the officer will be executing an impermissible incident search in 
subsequently utilizing the Sniffer to gather the requisite probable cause 
to justify an arrest; if, however, the officer has probable cause to make 
an arrest for drunk driving prior to using the Sniffer, then the search, 
assuming it is reasonableness, could be justified as incident to a lawful 
arrest, even if the arrest is not made until after the search is conducted. 170 
C. The Governmental Interests 
Finally, the third prong of the reasonableness inquiry considers the 
"nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue here, and 
officer may search the arrestee and the area "within his immediate control" to remove 
any weapons and seize any evidence in the arrestee's possession to prevent its 
destruction. Id. at 762-63. 
167. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). 
168. Id. at 63. In Sibron, a police officer observed Sibron conversing with six or 
eight persons whom the officer knew to be narcotics addicts over the course of an eight-
hour period. The officer did not overhear any part of the conversations nor did he see 
anything pass between Sibron and the other persons. Sibron was later observed talking 
with three more addicts inside a restaurant. The officer went into the restaurant and told 
Sibron to come outside whereupon the officer reached into Sibron's pocket and 
discovered glassine envelopes containing heroin. At a hearing for a motion to suppress, 
the prosecution argued that the officer had probable cause to believe that Sibron had 
narcotics on him because he had been seen talking with known addicts over the course of 
eight hours. Id. at 45-47. The Supreme Court stated that the heroin was clearly 
inadmissible against Sibron: "Nothing resembling probable cause existed until after the 
search had turned up the envelopes of heroin. . . . Thus the search cannot be justified as 
incident to a lawful arrest." Id. at 62-63 (citations omitted). 
169. Id. at 77. 
170. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 & n.6 (1980) ("Where the formal 
arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner's person, we 
do not believe it particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice 
versa" where "[t]he fruits of the search of petitioner's person were, of course, not 
necessary to support probable cause to arrest petitioner."). 
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the efficacy of this means for meeting it."171 Without question, drunk 
driving poses a serious concern to the entire nation. Indeed, as the Court 
recognized in South Dakota v. Neville: 172 "The situation underlying this 
case-that of the drunk driver--occurs with tragic frequency on our 
Nation's highways. The carnage caused by drunk drivers is well 
documented .... This Court ... has repeatedly lamented the tragedy."173 
Efforts to reduce the devastating and tragic consequences of drunk 
driving certainly should be applauded and encouraged. The nature of the 
government's concern-reducing alcohol related accidents and fatalities 
and making the roadways safer for all drivers-is of paramount 
importance. The immediacy of the concern is no less striking; the 
statistical data attesting to over 15,000 deaths in both 1998 and 1999, 
and over 16,000 deaths in 2000, is cause for alarm. President Clinton's 
signing into law a national standard that declares all drivers to be 
considered drunk at a BAC of .08 further speaks to the magnitude of the 
interest in ameliorating safety on the roadways. 
On the one hand, the argument stands that drunk driving is an acute 
problem in which the public has a legitimate, vested interest in seeing 
eradicated; if the Sniffer can help ferret out drunk drivers and get them 
off the road, then the balance must be tipped in the public's favor. The 
only catch is that constitutional protections must not be thrown out the 
window, even for a laudable cause.174 While mitigating the tragedy of 
171. Verononica Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,660 (1995). 
172. 459 U.S. 553 (1983). 
173. Id. at 558. 
174. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,459 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) ("[C]onsensus that a particular law enforcement technique serves a laudable 
purpose has never been the touchstone of constitutional analysis."); see also New Jersey 
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). In T.L.O., Justice Brennan stated: 
The Fourth Amendment was designed not merely to protect against official 
intrusions whose social utility was less as measured by some "balancing test" 
than its intrusion on individual privacy; it was designed in addition to grant the 
individual a zone of privacy whose protections could be breached only where 
the "reasonable" requirements of the probable-cause standard were met. 
Moved by whatever momentary evil has aroused their fears, officials-perhaps 
even supported by a majority of citizens-may be tempted to conduct searches 
that sacrifice the liberty of each citizen to assuage the perceived evil. But the 
Fourth Amendment rests on the principle that a true balance between the 
individual and society depends on the recognition of "the right to be let 
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men." 
Id. at 361-62 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
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drunk driving is a shared national interest, the efficacy of the Sniffer as a 
means to achieve this goal must not transgress the constitutional 
protections residing in the Fourth Amendment. 
The pressing need for the Sniff er may be questionable in light of 
already existing testing procedures for routing out drunk drivers. Apart 
from the officer's own sensory perceptions of the driver, 175 field sobriety 
tests can be used to aid the probable cause assessment prior to making an 
arrest for drunk driving. 176 In Kinberg v. District of Columbia, 177 a 
police officer, having lawfully stopped a vehicle for running a red light, 
ordered the driver out of the car for a field sobriety test after observing 
the driver's "glossy" eyes and "bloated" face. 178 The United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia addressed the issue of what 
"level of suspicion [is] required for the detention of a lawfully stopped 
175. "The most important test for determining intoxication or degree of intoxication 
has always been the subjective conclusion of the person making the determination based 
upon the clinical symptoms." L. Poindexter Watts, Some Observations on Police-
Administered Tests for Intoxication, 45 N.C. L. REv. 34, 41 (1966-1967). In a footnote, 
Watts states that '"clinical symptoms' is a phrase widely used in chemical-testing circles 
to indicate symptoms of intoxication that could be detected simply by careful 
observation." Id. at n.21. 
176. See Stone v. City of Huntsville, 656 So. 2d 404,409 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994). 
[A] stop of a motorist whom an officer reasonably suspects of driving under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs is no different from a Terry stop. Once the 
stop is effected, the detaining officer may, as part of the "moderate number of 
questions" asked of the motorist, request the motorist "to perform a simple 
balancing test," to recite the alphabet, and/or to perform a balancing exercise 
while counting aloud. If the officer's suspicions are dispelled during the brief 
detention and questioning, he must release the motorist. If the officer's 
suspicions are confirmed, he may charge the motorist with driving under the 
influence .... 
Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 
442 (1984)). "The law enforcement interest that the [field sobriety] tests serve is to help 
a police officer assess promptly the likelihood that a driver is intoxicated and to provide 
him with a reliable basis for making an arrest ... thereby preventing the driver from 
potentially killing or maiming himself or others." State v. Little, 468 A.2d 615, 617 
(Me. 1983). "The field sobriety tests are designed and administered to avoid the 
shortcomings of casual observation .... Thus they broaden the officer's observation of 
the defendant and enhance the basis and reliability of his opinion as to whether the 
driver's performance has been adversely affected by intoxicating liquor." State v. 
Arsenault, 336 A.2d 244, 246 (N.H. 1975) (citation omitted). "[Field sobriety tests] 
allow the officer to take notes, give the jury objective descriptions of clinical symptoms, 
and add convincing detail to the stock description of slurred speech, staggering gait, 
fumbling with wallet, bloodshot eyes, odor of alcohol, and disarray of clothing." Watts, 
supra note 175, at 46. 
177. No. 94-2516 (PLF), 1998 WL 10364 (D.D.C. Jan. 5, 1998), affd sub nom. 
Rogala v. District of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
178. Id. at *2. The officer first instructed the driver to count to five and back on the 
fingers of one hand, referred to as the "'finger count' test." Next, the driver was asked to 
perform an "'alphabet test"' by "reciting the alphabet from H to Z with his head tilted 
backwards." Id. 
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driver for a field sobriety test."179 The court stated: 
Because of the significant public interest in preventing a motorist whom an 
officer reasonably believes may be intoxicated from continuing to drive, and 
because further detention for a field sobriety test is a minimal intrusion on an 
already stopped individual's privacy ... many state courts have held that an 
officer may detain a motorist for such testing so long as there is reasonable 
suspicion that the driver may be intoxicated.180 
The court then adopted the reasonable suspicion standard 181 for 
conducting field sobriety tests and concluded that the test administered 
in this case satisfied that standard based on the officer's observations of 
the driver and the fact that the driver ran a red light. 182 
The tenth circuit similarly embraced the reasonable suspicion standard 
in Carlsen v. Duron.183 Here, police officers stopped Mr. Carlsen on a 
suspicion that he was either intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol 
after observing a traffic violation and unusual driving behavior. Field 
sobriety tests were given and Mr. Carlsen was arrested for driving under 
the influence of alcohol. 184 The tenth circuit disagreed with Mr. Carlsen 
that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by requiring him to 
submit to the field sobriety tests. Citing the Kinberg decision, the court 
said that the "requisite level of suspicion for Officer Harris to conduct 
field sobriety tests" was met where the initial stop was justified by a 
reasonable suspicion of intoxication, an observed traffic violation, and 
"slow driving and braking."185 
179. Id. at *8. The court stated that "[t]he [U.S.] Supreme Court has not directly 
addressed" this issue. Id. The Supreme Court has only stated that, while police may 
detain all drivers at sobriety checkpoints without any individualized suspicion, 
"[d]etention of particular motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing may require 
satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard." Michigan Dep't of State Police v. 
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990). 
180. Kinberg, 1998 WL 10364, at *8. Some state court decisions premise the 
reasonableness of field sobriety tests on the existence of a reasonable suspicion of 
intoxication. E.g., State v. Lamme, 563 A.2d 1372, 1375-76 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989), 
aff'd, 579 A.2d 484 (Conn. 1990); State v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d 171, 176 (Ariz. 
1986); State v. Wyatt, 687 P.2d 544,553 (Haw. 1984); Little, 468 A.2d at 617-18. 
181. For an overview of the reasonable suspicion standard, see discussion supra 
note 61. 
182. Kinberg, 1998 WL 10364, at *8. 
183. No. 99-4065, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 21428, at *9 (10th Cir. Aug. 24, 2000). 
184. Id. at *2-3. Mr. Carlsen was stopped around 1:20 a.m. after making a wide 
right hand turn in violation of a Utah statute, driving 20 m.p.h. in a 30 m.p.h. speed zone, 
and tapping his brakes twice to slow down for no apparent reason. Id. at *2. He failed 
his field sobriety tests. Id. at *3. 
185. Id. at *9. 
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If a police officer can require a driver to perform field sobriety tests 
based on only a reasonable suspicion that the driver is under the 
influence, and if, as a result of such testing and the officer's own 
subjective observations, the officer is able to form probable cause, the 
Sniffer becomes almost superfluous. Probable cause to arrest the driver 
for drunk driving only requires "a reasonable ground for belief of 
guilt," 186 which "'means less than evidence which would justify 
condemnation' or conviction."187 It does not require the officer's 
assessment of intoxication to be right. "[P]robable cause is a flexible, 
common-sense standard. . . . [I]t does not demand any showing that 
such a belief be correct or more likely true than false." 188 
D. Balancing the Vernonia Factors 
The balance to be struck in weighing these three factors, the privacy 
interest and level of intrusion on the one hand and the governmental 
interests on the other, remains somewhat precarious. Initially, it is 
difficult to denounce an instrument that has the potential to save lives 
and make the roadways safer for all motorists. However, safeguarding 
the right to privacy can be no less important. 
While all drivers may hold a privacy expectation in their breath, the 
level of intrusion imposed by a Sniffer search upon that privacy 
expectation and, concomitantly, the efficacy of the Sniffer in achieving 
the governmental interests, may differ, depending on the reasons a driver 
is stopped in the first place. A stop of a motorist is lawful when the 
police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the driver is operating the 
vehicle under the influence of alcohol. If a driver is observed weaving 
wildly in and out of lanes and otherwise driving erratically, appears 
drunk to the officer upon being stopped, slurs his speech, has glassy 
eyes, reeks of alcohol, and falls over upon exiting the vehicle, the driver 
likely gives the officer the requisite probable cause to make an arrest 
before a Sniffer is even operated. Such a driver falls into what shall be 
called the "obviously" drunk drivers. 
Then there are drivers who are pulled over because they are suspected 
of driving under the influence even though the officer does not have 
immediate probable cause to make an arrest. Also falling into this 
186. United States v. Lewis, 504 F.2d 92, 101 (6th Cir. 1974) (quoting Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). 
187. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175 (quoting Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 
339, 348 (1813)). "In dealing with probable cause ... we deal with probabilities. These 
are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on 
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Id. 
188. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). 
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category are drivers who are stopped for traffic violations-running a 
stop sign or driving with a broken taillight-and the officers, through 
their own observations in the course of investigating the infraction, come 
to suspect possible intoxication. These are the "maybe" drunk drivers, 
of whom officers, in addition to making their own subjective 
observations, may require field sobriety tests be performed. The Sniffer 
in this situation would augment the officer's probable cause assessment 
by providing the officer with an approximate BAC. 
Finally, there are those drivers who are pulled over for traffic 
violations and are never even suspected of having been driving under the 
influence of alcohol until the officer operates the Sniffer hidden inside 
the flashlight and gets a reading indicating the presence of alcohol. 
hnagine, for example, a person who has two glasses of wine at dinner 
and on his way home drives perfectly, although he runs through a stop 
sign not because he is drunk but because he is simply a bad driver, or 
was playing with his radio, or talking on a cellular phone. The officer 
pulls this man over to issue a citation for running the stop sign and never 
reasonably suspects alcohol to be a factor. Yet simply because he has 
the technology at hand, the officer turns on the Sniffer and now knows 
the man's BAC. For purposes of classification, these persons will be 
labeled the "bad" drivers. 
As to the obviously drunk drivers, the level of intrusion on their 
privacy interest in informing the officer of their BAC is minimized by 
the fact that the individuals clearly exhibit no interest in keeping their 
drunkenness hidden from public view. Considering that the probable 
cause to justify an arrest already exists, the Sniffer actually is not even 
needed. The officer's own subjective observations will be enough. So 
while the efficacy of the Sniffer in meeting the government's interest in 
detecting drunk drivers as to this particular group of drivers is 
questionable, the Sniffer is really not making known any information the 
obviously drunk driver has not already revealed. Surely it will be no 
surprise to the officer to discover the driver's BAC indicates intoxication. 
Moreover, once arrested, the driver can be required to submit to 
chemical testing of blood, breath or urine depending on the state's 
implied consent law. The intrusion into the privacy expectation of 
obviously drunk drivers is negligible; the governmental interest in 
getting these drivers off the road must be greater. As to these drivers, 
the Sniff er could be constitutional. 
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As to the maybe drunk drivers, the Sniffer likely admits to the same 
result when the government's interests are weighed against the 
individual's interest. Undoubtedly, some drivers who would have been 
able to slip through the cracks before by performing field sobriety tests 
perfectly and otherwise dispelling the suspicion of intoxication may now 
be arrested where the Sniffer's BAC is a dispositive factor in the 
officer's evaluation of the situation; the officer may decide, upon seeing 
the Sniffer's results, that the BAC along with the officer's observations 
is enough to warrant an arrest. Presumably more drunk drivers will now 
be arrested because it will not be as easy to fool law enforcement 
officials. The intrusion is likely greater here than it is for the obviously 
drunk drivers but probably not enough to push the Sniffer into 
unconstitutional territory. 
The maybe drunk drivers are already suspected of being under the 
influence of alcohol before the Sniffer is operated. They can be asked to 
perform field sobriety tests, which must be at least as intrusive as a 
search of their breath. The Sniffer is operated only to inform the 
officer's probable cause assessment; while its results may lead to an 
arrest, they may also serve to dispel a suspicion of intoxication and then 
the driver is free to go. So while these maybe drunk drivers will lift their 
Fourth Amendment shields and decry the intrusion into their privacy, the 
government's interests once again will likely prevail. 
Raising those same shields even higher are the bad drivers, for it is in 
this context that the intrusion seems most egregious. The use of the 
Sniffer becomes somewhat of a fishing expedition to catch drivers who 
have consumed alcohol in any amount. The officer can get a BAC even 
though without the Sniffer he never would have suspected alcohol to be 
involved; if any amount of alcohol is indicated giving the officer a 
reasonable suspicion that the driver has been drinking, the driver can be 
hassled to get out of the car and perform field sobriety tests. But for this 
technology, however, the driver would have gotten a ticket for the traffic 
violation and gone on the driver's way. 
When a driver is stopped, the scope of the officer's investigation is 
dependent on the circumstances that led to the detention. 189 An officer 
searching a person who just ran a stop sign or who was driving with a 
broken taillight for a BAC when that officer has no reasonable basis for 
189. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 299 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("When 
a person is detained, but not arrested, the detention must be justified by particularized 
police interests other than a desire to initiate a criminal proceeding against the person 
they detain. The police therefore cannot do more than investigate the circumstances that 
occasion the detention."); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 
(1975) ("[T]he stop and inquiry must be 'reasonably related in scope to the justification 
for their initiation."' (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968))). 
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suspecting alcohol consumption is exceeding the permissible scope of 
his investigation. The intrusion into matters the driver seeks to keep 
private, namely, the driver's BAC, is hardly palatable. The Sniffer is 
revealing information that would not otherwise have been disclosed and 
possibly leading to further testing of a driver who was merely expecting 
a ticket and a slap on the wrist. 
For these drivers, the Sniffer has invaded their legitimate expectations 
of privacy as to the state of their bodies by impennissibly conducting a 
clandestine search of their persons and revealing their BAC to the 
detaining officer. The privacy interests of the bad drivers, in light of the 
fact that other means already exist to ferret out drunk drivers, might be 
important enough to render the Sniffer an unconstitutional violation of 
their Fourth Amendment rights. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A technological device that is constitutional as to some drivers and 
unconstitutional as to others treads into dangerous territory where an 
officer has discretion to decide who can and cannot be lawfully tested. It 
is foreseeable that an officer could justify his use of the Sniffer on a bad 
driver by falsely articulating generalized statements that suggest the 
officer had a suspicion of alcohol consumption, thereby turning a bad 
driver into a maybe drunk driver. 
In Breithaupt v. Abram190 the Court said: 
Modem community living requires modem scientific methods of crime 
detection lest the public go unprotected. The increasing slaughter on our 
highways, most of which should be avoidable, now reaches the astounding 
figures only heard of on the battlefield. The States, through safety measures, 
modem scientific methods, and strict enforcement of traffic laws, are using all 
reasonable means to make automobile driving less dangerous.191 
Such "modern scientific methods" as passive alcohol sensors must, 
however, recognize the constitutional protections afforded every citizen 
of the United States. At the rate technology is moving forward, the 
privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment must be strictly 
safeguarded. As the Supreme Court ever so aptly stated: "The question 
we confront today is what limits there are upon [the] power of 
190. 352 U.S. 432 (1957). 
191. Id. at 439 (footnote omitted). 
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technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy." 192 Imagine a 
device that could test a driver's blood for a BAC without the driver's 
knowledge and without the driver feeling a thing. Surely such a 
technological innovation seems intrusive. A point must exist when the 
individual's privacy interests trump the technological means that would 
render the Fourth Amendment nothing more than mere words that had 
force in a world technologically ignorant from the present one. 
Technology has the ability to step all over whatever shreds of privacy 
individuals can manage to hold onto in the twenty-first century. Yet 
because the purpose of some of these devices, such as the Sniffer, is to 
aid law enforcement in decreasing crime and increasing safety for all 
citizens alike, exactly where the balance between privacy and crime-
prevention will be drawn is hard to say. Ultimately, the Supreme Court 
will have to tackle the issue and if the people's Fourth Amendment 
shields fall this time, given the speed of technological innovation, surely 
they will rise again. 
JENNIFER HARTUNIAN 
192. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
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